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Abstract 
 
In this paper, the authors address the perceived recent trend of funding and publishing bodies that 
seem to have taken a regard of qualitative research as a subordinate to, or even a subset of, 
quantitative research. In this reflection, they pull on insights that Hans-Georg Gadamer offered 
around the history of the natural and human science bifurcation, ending with a plea that 
qualitative research needs to be received, appraised, judged, and promoted by different lenses 
and criteria of value. 
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In February 2016, an open letter was published in The BMJ where 76 senior academics from 11 
countries challenged The BMJ to reconsider their practice of rejecting qualitative research as low 
priority, lacking practical value and interest to readers, and being unlikely to be cited 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2016). The published letter makes a compelling argument for the need for 
complementary perspectives that are embraced by quantitative and qualitative research methods, 
citing and commending organizations that lay claim to the idea that “quantitative versus 
qualitative is yesterday’s war” (p. 4). 
 
We applaud this letter and its intent, but offer that, from our perspectives, this “war” seems to 
have returned and seems to be alive and well today, unfortunately. We can only speculate on 
what drives the majority of funding agencies to fund primarily, if not exclusively, quantitative 
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studies. At best, to be funded, a study must contain “mixed” or “multiple” methods, whereby the 
qualitative aspect is generally a watered-down version of what could stand as a sophisticated 
method in and of itself, cobbled onto a quantitative study. For example, to have a study that is 
purely hermeneutic in nature funded by a major granting agency is becoming increasing 
impossible, it seems. Yet, hermeneutics as a research method is a rich, sophisticated, well-
documented approach to the human sciences that is grounded in a long tradition of philosophical 
thought dating back to the Greeks, manifested in over three decades of research in the human 
sciences (Moules, McCaffrey, Field, & Laing, 2015). Similarly, we run into the very problem 
that the authors (Greenhalgh et al., 2016) identified with The BMJ: Getting published is 
becoming more difficult and, more often than not, the reviewers of submitted hermeneutic 
research manuscripts are guided by very different understandings, and regularly demonstrate an 
apparent misunderstanding of the purpose, substance, and contribution to the understanding that 
hermeneutics can make.  
 
In this paper, we take the stance that qualitative research addresses and answers different 
questions than quantitative research and it needs to be seen differently, and more importantly, 
evaluated differently. We draw on hermeneutic philosophy to offer some of the distinctions that 
hermeneutic research, as one example of qualitative work, can bring to knowledge. 
 
“What is established by statistics seems to be a language of facts, but which questions these facts 
answer and which facts would begin to speak if other questions are asked are hermeneutical 
questions” (Gadamer, 2007, p. 84).  Gadamer reminds us that facts are important but also that 
there are different kinds of facts and different meanings of facts.  
 
The development of the natural sciences as a rigorous method comes with a history that has 
bequeathed to us a seemingly impenetrable order that is imposed in research. 
 
What imposed itself in the seventeenth century was a new concept of science. Founded 
upon experimentation and mathematics, it was a new attitude focused on quantification 
that, in constant progress and lasting self-improvement, eventually transformed science 
into research. (Gadamer, 1988/2016, p. 35) 
 
This new concept of science created a bifurcation whereby the human sciences became the 
country cousin to the natural sciences, at best being regarded as an inexact science and, at worst, 
as nothing of value beyond self-indulgent subjectivity. Thus, “being subjective” (as opposed to 
being “objective”) was leveled as a criticism at qualitative research and any claims to truth were 
dismissed as soft, rigor was questioned, and the un-testability of the results posited as a serious 
limitation. Moules was recently asked by a colleague, how she could prove that her 
interpretations in her research were true and, if she could not prove they were, was the research 
method more like religion than it was like research? Forgotten in this question is what truth 
means and Gadamer’s distinction between certainty and truth is useful here.  
 
What motivates the priority of self-consciousness over against the consciousness of 
things in modern thinking is the primacy of certainty over truth, which was founded on 
the idea of method in modern science…method has been understood as a path towards 
reaching certainty. (Gadamer, 1975/2016, p. 128) 
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We think, in this instance, the challenge was based on the assumption that, in a religious sense, 
truth is aligned with faith, and faith is often critiqued as being blind. However, there are certain 
overlaps between faith in religion and openness in hermeneutics. Both rely on an absence of 
certainty, an absence of proof, and on the possibility that what you find might be wrong. Indeed, 
faith can only exist where there is uncertainty, and you cannot have faith without uncertainty. 
Fanaticism, then - - the defining quality being extreme, uncritical, single-minded zeal (Merriam-
Webster, n.d.) - - is the opposite of faith because of the degree of certainty required. You do not 
need faith if you are a fanatic because you “know” it to be true. A fanatic, as Winston Churchill 
said, “is someone who can’t change his mind and won't change the subject.” Thus, certainty and 
proof are an anathema in both religion and hermeneutics - and yet there is also truth in both.  
 
Truth in qualitative work is often erroneously thought of as subjective correspondence between 
thought and world. 
 
Hermeneutic truth is plural, not singular, in this way: There is not one right way to help 
all patients recover from cancer, for example, or a single method for helping every child 
learn to read. At the same time, not every way is right. We can get it wrong; we can make 
people sicker in trying to help them heal. We can make learning to read impossible; while 
trying to teach, we can deceive ourselves thoroughly and fall into untruth (Wrathall, 
2013) in the very pursuit of truth…. truth is tricky in hermeneutic work because it 
disappears as it appears. We never get “the whole truth and nothing but the truth,” 
because truth is both revealed to us and concealed from us at once. (Moules et al., 2015, 
p. 76) 
 
When method leads us to certainty rather than truth, as in the way that interpretations that hold 
up are “true” of something that brings us closer to understanding the topic, then certainty closes 
off any further understanding. Certainty is in alliance and partnership with agreement, and 
Gadamer reminds us that mutual understanding does not imply agreement; in fact, if agreement 
exists, then there is no need to seek understanding as it has already been relegated to certainty 
(Vandevelde & Iyer, 2016).  
 
The provocative question asked by the colleague encapsulates the very critique that is often 
leveled at qualitative research and that ends up in a diminishment or dismissal of what it has to 
offer. Sometimes, and more frequently it seems, it results in such studies not being evaluated as 
worthy of funding. An example we offer is a study that Moules and colleagues have been trying 
to have funded for many years involving an examination of parents’ experiences of anticipatory 
grief of knowing their child is dying, in relationship to their experiences of post death grief. The 
reviews received on grant applications consistently suggest that, since the study was not going to 
involve any measurement of these experiences, the value of the study was questionable. There is 
much debate in the fields of thanatology, grief, and bereavement of whether or not measuring 
grief is possible but even with those who believe it is and that such a tool is valuable, there is 
consensus that the experience of grief is complex, immeasurable, deeply individual and 
experiential - - far beyond what any tool might discern. There are aspects of grief that can never 
be measured or, in some ways, ever articulated (Moules, 2010). Grief is a profound experience of 
suffering that invariably escapes our capacity to quantify. 
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It is indeed true that experience and the natural sciences founded upon experience carry 
with them the following assumption about being of nature: that which is without 
foundation, the accidental, the miraculous has no place in it…It can be said, though, that 
experience teaches us precisely that unpredictable arbitrariness of human beings 
constantly intervenes in the course of nature. (Gadamer, 1964/2016, p. 3) 
 
Human experience, upon which qualitative research is based, is complex and often cannot be 
explained, and Gadamer suggested that “the complex does not have the character of a connection 
between cause and effect in the way it underlies our knowledge and calculation of the course of 
nature” (p. 4). He challenged the fundamental assumption of science in being able to determine 
precisely both the cause and effect, claiming that the opposite is often true when it comes to 
experience: sometimes “small causes have huge consequences” (p. 4).  
 
For a full century, we have attempted to delineate the human sciences by contrasting 
them with the natural sciences, to the extent that the human sciences have been measured 
by the scientific character proper to the kind of sciences they are…Now present-day 
researcher opine that both groups of sciences might eventually merge together again, but 
not because the so-called human science would in the meantime have become more exact 
but because the natural sciences themselves would have transformed. (Gadamer, 
1988/2016, p. 25) 
 
The demand for verification, correctness, and provability underlies the exactness of the natural 
sciences, and we concede that some things need to be exact and verified, but we offer that few 
things can be, and some need not be. Gadamer harkens us back to the idea of myths. Myths do 
not demand verification and they are not provable. “‘Myth’ indeed means nothing other than 
narrative, but it is a narrative that authenticates itself, that is to say: a narrative that one does not 
attempt to authenticate and confirm” (p. 31), reminding us that Aristotle claimed that it is “mark 
of the educated person to know of what to demand proofs and of what not to demand them” (p. 
31). We do not need to demand proof of the suffering of parents who have lost a child to cancer 
(Moules, Estefan, McCaffrey, Tapp, & Strother, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c); we do not need to 
demand proof that children’s cancer camps make a difference in the lives of families 
experiencing cancer (Laing & Moules, 2015). We do not need to verify that relationships matter 
in teaching, or that children ought to be treated with respect, or that what they have to say about 
what they know is important, or that teachers need to listen carefully to those they teach. What 
we do need to do is to ask of these experiences, to probe them for what is meaningful, to make 
sense of what our patients or students live through, that is, we have to understand them so that 
we can help them heal and learn. In doing so, we have to better understand ourselves in relation 
to our patients or students and understanding, in relation to others, is not something that needs to 
be verified in a scientific sense. Rather, understanding is about discovering the rich contours of 
the lives we inquire into, and what matters or does not matter, that is, what helps. When we 
examine our own understanding and praxis in the face of the suffering we encounter, and when 
we respond appropriately to the miracles and the mysteries that arise suddenly in the middle of 
our inquiries, hermeneutic inquiry can reveal things science cannot. These are narratives that 
authenticate themselves in relationships that teach or heal.  
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We can formulate this concern about philosophy with the following question: can 
philosophy in the age of modern science be understood as something more than 
an 'ancilla scientiarum, the handmaiden of the sciences...called to service with the 
ceremonious name of "theory of knowledge"'? Gadamer's answer to the question is an 
emphatic 'yes' because scientific knowledge can tell us nothing about human praxis at the 
individual and social level. (Vandevelde & Iyer, 2016, p. xxviii) 
 
When he [Gadamer] speaks about how the human sciences cannot aspire to the same 
level of scientificity and objectivity of knowledge as the natural sciences, he is making a 
plea for the contemporary relevance of praxis against the exclusive power of 
epistemē and for the role of practical philosophy as it is embodied in the human sciences. 
This is how Gadamer may concede the truth of the mocking remark made by the Vienna 
Circle about the human sciences being at most ten percent science when it comes to their 
scientificity. But he emphasizes that it is the other ninety percent that is the most crucial 
from the standpoint of human existence as it concerns shared living and solidarity. 
(Vandevelde & Iyer, 2016, p. xxix) 
 
Returning to the question of faith, truth, and religion, it is possible that one can become a 
fanatical hermeneut, falling prey to the lure of certainty. Let us be clear: We are not arguing here 
that qualitative research is better than quantitative. We are arguing that it is different and that it 
reveals equally important insights into practice, that is, it needs to be valued equally. It also 
needs to have its own rigor. Moules et al. (2015) addressed the issue of rigor and validation in 
hermeneutic work in particular, suggesting that the rigor that is sought in interpretive research 
does not conform to that of being strict, inflexible, exact, precise, accurate, and rigid. It does, 
however, meet another definition of rigor which is the “quality of being careful” (p. 171). 
Qualitative research must treat its topics care-fully (with care and fully), seeing validity that is 
located in being strong, powerful, robust, healthy, and telling (Moules et al., 2015, p. 172). It 
should yield insight into the human condition. It should help us decide how we might live well 
with others, how we might, given their lives, help them heal or learn. The difficulty lies, however, 
in how to convince those we rely on for funding or dissemination that our work is underpinned 
by these traits and, more importantly, that these traits matter as much as measures of exactness, 
causality, prediction, and repeatability.  
 
Twenty years ago, qualitative work was recognized as legitimate; the accessibility of federal 
funding was evidence of this. Guidelines for Tri-Council funding in Canada even added a 
chapter on evaluating qualitative work differently with different standards. Publication in 
reputable journals did not require a desperate back-and-forth battle with uniformed reviewers. 
Qualitative journals sprang up; qualitative research institutes blossomed, and it no longer felt as 
though we were in competition with our big city cousin. We can only speculate on what has 
made the pendulum swing again. In current times, it might be economically driven – 
hermeneutics does not produce jobs, new technologies, or cures. The increased emphasis on 
evidence-based practice may be a factor. This, however, begs the question: What counts as 
evidence? How is it that we have shifted from the original tenets of evidence-based practice as a 
trinity of research evidence - health professional experience and judgment, and patient 
preferences - to one that prioritizes only quantitative research? If evidence only lies in numbers, 
mathematics, statistics, and calculability, then it makes sense that the kinds of results that arise 
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from qualitative research hold little utility from this perspective. Those results do not address 
causality or predictability; they do not speak to health economics or produce new drugs. Rather, 
they help us understand what it means to be human and to live together well. Is this enough? 
Given that the state of the world does not seem to be a “scientific problem,” we think so. “To 
understand the other is truly a difficult art, but also a human task” (Gadamer, 1988/2016, p. 39). 
 
Gadamer (1988/2016) invoked as well the influence of modern technology as having played a 
factor in the objectification of the human sciences. “Increasingly, even the sciences we call 
human sciences, share in the progress of this technological development of the means of 
knowledge and information” (p. 38). 
 
How much more complete is a computer generated index of today…But is it really only a 
progress…although all the information we need is available immediately, I wonder 
whether it is not better that, when having forgotten something, I have to look for it again 
and, perhaps, in the process find something other than what I was looking for. This is 
what we truly call doing research: to ask questions that always lead to further question, 
which we did not anticipate. We are now facing totally new possibilities for alleviating 
the burden on our memory. This entails that we no longer need our own mental power in 
order to reawaken what we have forgotten and we no longer nurture recollection…this 
situation cannot be totally different in the natural sciences…we have come so far with 
these new advances that research, which previously required twenty years, can now 
produce results with a computer in a matter of minutes. This has undoubtedly resulted in 
gains, but also in tasks that turn out to be evermore difficult when it comes to the rational 
application of our know-how. We only have to think of the beneficial wonder of 
forgetting and the transfigurative magical power of remembering. The retrieval of data 
from databases will not give us anything so felicitous. (Gadamer, 1988/2016, pp. 38-39) 
 
In conclusion, qualitative research is not a “soft,” or “dumbed down” version of quantitative 
research. It is a different kind of research aimed, not simply at knowing, but more fully at living 
an ethical life as practitioners, something that cannot be achieved solely through science. If it is 
research aimed at helping us live well “with and for others in just institutions,” as Ricoeur (1992, 
p. 352) suggested, then it cannot be submitted to an explanatory science that only accounts for 
causality and order.  
 
Human sciences rather belong to orders that constantly configure and reconfigure 
themselves through our own concrete participation in them and thereby contribute to our 
knowledge about the human possibilities and normative commonalities that affect us. 
Thus, the human sciences bring us before ourselves…Of all the sciences, it is especially 
the so-called human sciences that contribute the most to the nurturing of these capacities. 
They force us to confront constantly in all its richness the entire scale of what is human 
and all too human. (Gadamer, 1988/2016, p. 41) 
 
What it means to be human and “all too human” is what tethers qualitative research to the real 
world. Qualitative research articulates human experience; it brings language to experience and 
then complements this articulation with a depth that helps us understand it. Understanding what 
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it means to be human, and how we can help others flourish, is not a trite matter but, rather, a 
difficult, on-going human task, and no computer can relieve us from its burden.
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